Bigger thriller in Manila: Asean point man to deal with China

Point man: Asean has designated Manila its ‘leader’ in dealings with China, but can the moody Duterte, here shown bonding with Xi on a visit to Beijing in 2016, clinch a an agreement from China for the regional association? — AP

https://youtu.be/iMB26dijZAE https://youtu.be/tedFwDyW2Uo

NOW that the quartet of Asean-related summits is over for the year, so should the niggling criticisms. At least they should – more important matters are at hand.

Over the week Singapore hosted the 2nd RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) Summit, the 13th East Asia Summit, the 21st Asean Plus Three Summit, and – not least – the 33rd Asean Summit.

These summits were held because it was time they were, and Singapore hosted them because it was its turn. But criticisms were not far behind.

US President Donald Trump was a no-show, and so was Chinese President Xi Jinping. Vice-President Mike Pence and Prime Minister Li Keqiang attended instead.

Trump was criticised for his absence, which allegedly “left the region wide open” for Xi’s China to make further inroads here. That complaint was limited only by Xi’s own absence.

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte was also criticised for not attending an “informal breakfast summit” between Asean and Australian leaders.

His said it was only an informal event, and it was over breakfast which he did not eat.

A casual observer may be forgiven for sensing that there must be more important developments than these scheduled rounds of handshakes and photo opportunities. There are.

One of these begins in two days: Xi’s state visit to the Philippines, following the scheduled 30th Apec Summit in Papua New Guinea.

Duterte had made three visits to China as President, inviting Xi to visit Manila each time. This will be Xi’s first state visit, coming upon the third invitation to him.

There will be handshakes and photo opportunities too, but the substance and symbolism now may be more than the recent multiple summits in Singapore and Papua New Guinea.

The Philippines has been vocal about rival claims to territory in the South China Sea. The previous The region is generally unsettled by China’s recent occupation and construction of islands, with Vietnam remaining most disturbed. Duterte’s critics have also blamed him for being soft on Beijing.

However, Xi’s visit is expected to be smooth with an emphasis on the positives. These include mutual interests deemed to be larger than interminable disputes over distant rocks and islets.

Last year Chinese Vice-Premier Wang Yang visited Manila for four days amid more audible protests over territory such as Benham Rise. Yet the visit proceeded unhindered.

This time it is President Xi himself, for a state visit of only two days, with no particular complaint against China outstanding. It will also be after one full year of China having become the Philippines’ main trading partner.

For both sides the focus will be quite intense on specific projects backed by Chinese assistance. Duterte left the merrymaking in Papua New Guinea early to return home to prepare for Xi’s arrival.

For China, it would demonstrate to the region how it can cooperate with even a country locked in dispute with it to mutual benefit. This gains added significance when it is the Philippines, historically a US ally.

For the Philippines, there is a host of projects and programmes on Duterte’s wish list requiring Chinese aid. They span his ambitious 9-trillion peso (RM717bil) “Build, Build, Build” infrastructure plan covering all three regions of the Philippines: Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.

These come under the Six-Year Development Program (SYDP) signed last year with China as a framework for the Philippines’ “Golden Age of Infrastructure.” It is to be Duterte’s legacy for his country.

The 75 projects include a water pump and irrigation scheme, a dam, a north-south railway, a highway, bridges, a park and a rehabilitated power plant. Economic growth is projected to outpace debt.

Duterte is clear-minded enough to know that only China is able and willing to provide the assistance needed. No other country or combination of countries is in a position to do so.

There are also plans for more Chinese business investments, as well as a framework agreement for joint oil and gas explorations at sea. The latter are understood to cover some disputed areas, with China agreeing to only a 40% share of recoverable deposits.

Countries in dispute over territory and the reserves found therein tend to shy from joint exploration, as legally this may imply recognition of the other disputing party’s claim.

But since this condition applies equally to both parties, the Philippines may be confident that China would also be obliged to acknowledge the Philippine claim. Can there be a lesson here for other Asean countries with claims to the South China Sea?

To ensure the success of Xi’s visit, there had been a positive build-up of Philippines-China relations in recent months. Xi’s state visit in turn is envisaged to lead to even better bilateral relations.

Last August, joint simulated naval exercises were held in Singapore among Asean countries and China without US participation. Manila defended that decision by saying that the “tabletop” drill was meant only for neighbouring countries in the region.

Now as Xi prepares for his visit, the US Pacific Fleet is reportedly readying a series of naval operations as a “show of force” in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits. In response to China’s stated concern, the Philippines said it will have no part in those operations.Xi’s visit is important not just for the Philippines but also Asean, which had designated Manila the “point man” in dealings with China. Can Duterte clinch an agreement from China for Asean?

Manila had said that a legally binding Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea was on the agenda, but Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said it may take another three years.

If China really wants to prove its goodwill in Manila, Xi could suggest it may happen considerably sooner.

The last Chinese President to make a state visit to the Philippines was Hu Jintao in 2005. That occasion also marked the 30th anniversary of bilateral relations, which is as auspicious a time as any.

This Tuesday’s visit by Xi will be the first Chinese state visit in 13 years. That is an auspicious number in Chinese, but not so in Western culture.

Will it be auspicious for the Philippines, the only Christian-majority country in the region once colonised by Spain and then the US? Duterte’s original style of leadership may yet make the difference.

By Behind The Headlines Bunn Nagara

Bunn Nagara is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia.

Related:  

 

Not all smooth at regional meetings

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Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) CEO Summit 2018: Good reason for China's rising popularity in South Pacific

 

Import expo to improve trade balance: Xi addresses opening ceremony of the CIIE; When realities hit the ‘Road’

Bigger thriller in Manila: Asean point man to deal with China

Point man: Asean has designated Manila its ‘leader’ in dealings with China, but can the moody Duterte, here shown bonding with Xi on a visit to Beijing in 2016, clinch a an agreement from China for the regional association? — AP

https://youtu.be/iMB26dijZAE https://youtu.be/tedFwDyW2Uo

NOW that the quartet of Asean-related summits is over for the year, so should the niggling criticisms. At least they should – more important matters are at hand.

Over the week Singapore hosted the 2nd RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) Summit, the 13th East Asia Summit, the 21st Asean Plus Three Summit, and – not least – the 33rd Asean Summit.

These summits were held because it was time they were, and Singapore hosted them because it was its turn. But criticisms were not far behind.

US President Donald Trump was a no-show, and so was Chinese President Xi Jinping. Vice-President Mike Pence and Prime Minister Li Keqiang attended instead.

Trump was criticised for his absence, which allegedly “left the region wide open” for Xi’s China to make further inroads here. That complaint was limited only by Xi’s own absence.

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte was also criticised for not attending an “informal breakfast summit” between Asean and Australian leaders.

His said it was only an informal event, and it was over breakfast which he did not eat.

A casual observer may be forgiven for sensing that there must be more important developments than these scheduled rounds of handshakes and photo opportunities. There are.

One of these begins in two days: Xi’s state visit to the Philippines, following the scheduled 30th Apec Summit in Papua New Guinea.

Duterte had made three visits to China as President, inviting Xi to visit Manila each time. This will be Xi’s first state visit, coming upon the third invitation to him.

There will be handshakes and photo opportunities too, but the substance and symbolism now may be more than the recent multiple summits in Singapore and Papua New Guinea.

The Philippines has been vocal about rival claims to territory in the South China Sea. The previous The region is generally unsettled by China’s recent occupation and construction of islands, with Vietnam remaining most disturbed. Duterte’s critics have also blamed him for being soft on Beijing.

However, Xi’s visit is expected to be smooth with an emphasis on the positives. These include mutual interests deemed to be larger than interminable disputes over distant rocks and islets.

Last year Chinese Vice-Premier Wang Yang visited Manila for four days amid more audible protests over territory such as Benham Rise. Yet the visit proceeded unhindered.

This time it is President Xi himself, for a state visit of only two days, with no particular complaint against China outstanding. It will also be after one full year of China having become the Philippines’ main trading partner.

For both sides the focus will be quite intense on specific projects backed by Chinese assistance. Duterte left the merrymaking in Papua New Guinea early to return home to prepare for Xi’s arrival.

For China, it would demonstrate to the region how it can cooperate with even a country locked in dispute with it to mutual benefit. This gains added significance when it is the Philippines, historically a US ally.

For the Philippines, there is a host of projects and programmes on Duterte’s wish list requiring Chinese aid. They span his ambitious 9-trillion peso (RM717bil) “Build, Build, Build” infrastructure plan covering all three regions of the Philippines: Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.

These come under the Six-Year Development Program (SYDP) signed last year with China as a framework for the Philippines’ “Golden Age of Infrastructure.” It is to be Duterte’s legacy for his country.

The 75 projects include a water pump and irrigation scheme, a dam, a north-south railway, a highway, bridges, a park and a rehabilitated power plant. Economic growth is projected to outpace debt.

Duterte is clear-minded enough to know that only China is able and willing to provide the assistance needed. No other country or combination of countries is in a position to do so.

There are also plans for more Chinese business investments, as well as a framework agreement for joint oil and gas explorations at sea. The latter are understood to cover some disputed areas, with China agreeing to only a 40% share of recoverable deposits.

Countries in dispute over territory and the reserves found therein tend to shy from joint exploration, as legally this may imply recognition of the other disputing party’s claim.

But since this condition applies equally to both parties, the Philippines may be confident that China would also be obliged to acknowledge the Philippine claim. Can there be a lesson here for other Asean countries with claims to the South China Sea?

To ensure the success of Xi’s visit, there had been a positive build-up of Philippines-China relations in recent months. Xi’s state visit in turn is envisaged to lead to even better bilateral relations.

Last August, joint simulated naval exercises were held in Singapore among Asean countries and China without US participation. Manila defended that decision by saying that the “tabletop” drill was meant only for neighbouring countries in the region.

Now as Xi prepares for his visit, the US Pacific Fleet is reportedly readying a series of naval operations as a “show of force” in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits. In response to China’s stated concern, the Philippines said it will have no part in those operations.Xi’s visit is important not just for the Philippines but also Asean, which had designated Manila the “point man” in dealings with China. Can Duterte clinch an agreement from China for Asean?

Manila had said that a legally binding Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea was on the agenda, but Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said it may take another three years.

If China really wants to prove its goodwill in Manila, Xi could suggest it may happen considerably sooner.

The last Chinese President to make a state visit to the Philippines was Hu Jintao in 2005. That occasion also marked the 30th anniversary of bilateral relations, which is as auspicious a time as any.

This Tuesday’s visit by Xi will be the first Chinese state visit in 13 years. That is an auspicious number in Chinese, but not so in Western culture.

Will it be auspicious for the Philippines, the only Christian-majority country in the region once colonised by Spain and then the US? Duterte’s original style of leadership may yet make the difference.

By Behind The Headlines Bunn Nagara

Bunn Nagara is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia.

Related:  

 

Not all smooth at regional meetings

Related posts:  

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) CEO Summit 2018: Good reason for China's rising popularity in South Pacific

 

Import expo to improve trade balance: Xi addresses opening ceremony of the CIIE; When realities hit the ‘Road’

Ugly business of Pilipinos kidnapping in Malaysia

It is understandable that family members of a hostage would want to see their loved one released as quick as possible but paying the ransom only encourages the crime to flourish. 
 
Last week, the whisper among the intelligence operatives in Sabah is that the asking price for the Taiwanese tourist kidnapped from Pom Pom island is RM10mil.

When I heard that was the amount demanded for the release of 58-year-old Chang An Wei abducted at gunpoint after her 57-year-old husband Hsu Li Min was shot dead by Filipino gunmen in the exclusive island resort off Semporna town on Nov 15, I worried about the consequences of paying for her freedom.

I tweeted: “If ransom is paid for Taiwanese hostage abducted from Pom Pom, $$$ will be invested into powerful boats & guns. Expect more kidnappings.”

Intelligence operatives also speculated that Chang was on the way to Jolo or was already on the island, the kidnap capital of the Philippines.

Kidnapping is big business in Jolo.

Last year, in Zamboanga City in southern Philippines, I had a chat with Lee Peng Wee. The tycoon made his money through seaweed grown mostly in kidnap-prone Philippines provinces such as Sulu and Tawi Tawi.

He was instrumental in securing the release of nine Sabahans kidnapped in Sipadan and held in Jolo in 2000. The Sipadan kidnapping was big international news – 21 hostages were abducted, including 10 tourists from Europe and the Middle East.

At his residence where 12 years ago he and Malaysian negotiators strategised on buying the Malaysians’ freedom, I asked him how the situation in Jolo was.

“It is the same. They kidnap two and release one. They kidnap three and release two,” he said, referring to Filipinos abducted in southern Philippines.

“Kidnapping is easy money. These people do not have a steady livelihood.”

The typical modus operandi is: kidnap-for-ransom group will abduct rich individuals in southern Philippines and they then sell the human commodity to bandits (some using the name of Abu Sayyaf) in Jolo. The island is so lawless that it is a “holding pen” for hostages.

Many in Malaysia assume that the Filipino kidnap-for-ransom group only targeted the east coast of Sabah. Wrong.

On Tuesday, JV Rufino, the Director for Mobile for the Inquirer Group in the Philippines, tweeted a link to a Philippines Daily Inquirer story headlined, “Military: Abu Sayyaf behind Sulu treasurer’s abduction”.

In Jolo, Sulu provincial treasurer Jesus Cabelin was allegedly taken by a group led by Julli Ikit and Ninok Sappari, who is a member of the Abu Sayyaf, according to the Philippines Daily Inquirer.

It reported that Sappari was “linked to several incidents of abduction in the island-province, including the March 2012 disappearance of Indian national Viju Kolara Veetil and six health workers of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao”.

“The victims were later freed after ransom had been allegedly paid,” the report continued.

Cabelin was the fourth kidnap victim in Jolo since Oct 22. Kidnapping is common in the Philippines especially in Jolo and nearby provinces.

However, it is rare for these groups to operate outside of Filipino waters. If you count the numbers of actual kidnappings at resorts in the east coast of Sabah, there are only three – Sipadan in 2000, Padanan in 2000 and Pom Pom in 2013.

(This count does not include kidnapping cases such as the abduction of the cousins who owned a bird’s nest farm in Lahad Datu or seaweed farm owners in Semporna).

One way to stop kidnappings by Filipino armed groups inside Malaysian waters is to stop paying for ransom.

Ransom was paid for all the 21 Sipadan hostages except Filipino cook Roland Ullah who “walked out” of captivity in 2003.

The then Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi bankrolled the payment for European and Filipina hostages and Malaysian businessmen raised the money to free the Sabahans. (The ransom for the first hostage – a Malaysian – released was paid for by a Filipino tycoon who described to me the payment as “small change”.)

At the back of my mind during the Sipadan hostage crisis, I was worried that ransom payment would only encourage kidnap-for-ransom groups to launch more kidnappings in my home state of Sabah.

Nevertheless, if you were a family member of a hostage, you would understand that not paying ransom is an option you would not consider.

I’ve met the Malaysian hostages twice while they were held by the Abu Sayyaf and I’ve spoken to almost all their family members, so I understand the agony they faced.

The negotiation for the release of the hostages dragged until Aug 20, 2000, when the last of three abducted Malaysians were released. Less than a month later, Filipino gunmen raided Padanan island and abducted three Malaysians on Sept 10.

This time the mood from the top was “no negotiation” with the kidnappers. Kuala Lumpur had learnt its lesson – paying ransom for hostages only encouraged the crime to flourish.

The then Philippines President Joseph Estrada ordered a military offensive on the Padanan kidnappers in Jolo. The three Malaysians were released after 46 days in captivity following a military operation.

That was the last raid by Filipino gunmen on a Malaysian island until the killing and kidnapping in Pom Pom.
Paying for Chang’s ransom will only encourage more kidnappings in Malaysian waters.

Contributed by One Man's Meat Philip Golingai

Stop paying quit rent to Sultan of Sulu, it’s time to close the chapter

Safeguarding our territory: Malaysian troops moving into Tanduo village during an operation to flush out the armed intruders. — (Handout photo by Defence Ministry)

 

A major shift in Malaysia's position on the Philippine claim to Sabah is needed. 
 
THE Philippines Government officially announced their claim to North Borneo (now Sabah) on June 22, 1962. Despite numerous attempts to settle the issue, it still festers on, exemplified by the latest tragic events unfolding on the east coast of Sabah.

The Philippine claim is based on two documents dated Jan 22, 1878. By the first document, Sultan Muhammad Jamaluladzam granted (pajak) all his territorial possessions in Borneo (tanah besar Pulau Berunai) to Gustavus Baron de Overbeck and Alfred Dent Esquire as representatives of a British Company for a yearly payment/ quit rent (hasil pajakan) of five thousand dollars (Spanish dollars).

By the second document, the said Sultan appointed Overbeck as “Dato' Bendahara and Rajah of Sandakan” with the fullest powers of a “supreme ruler” (penghulu pemerintah atas kerajaan yang tersebut itu).

Descendants of Sultan Muhammad Jamaluladzam (the number cannot be ascertained, but is large), represented by the Kiram Corporation and the Philippine Government, have always claimed that this 1878 grant was a lease (pajakan) and not a cession as claimed by Malaysia. The continuous annual payment of the quit rent or cession monies of five thousand dollars (now RM5,300) to these descendants is cited as further proof of this contention. Based on these grounds, they claim, Sabah belongs to the Philippines/ the Sultan of Sulu's descendants.

Before discussing how Malaysia has been responding to this assertion and how it should alter its position drastically, a little bit of historical narrative is in order.

Without going too far back in time, it is suffice to say historical documents confirm that both the Sultanate of Brunei and the Sultanate of Sulu exercised political control over parts of present-day Sabah (there was no State or Negeri Sabah at that time) in the late 19th century. Brunei had defacto jurisdiction on the west coast from Kimanis to Pandasan, while Sulu ruled the east coast from Marudu to the Sibuku River. The interior was largely independent under local indigenous suku chiefs.

Both Sultanates, however, claimed dejure jurisdiction from the Pandasan on the west coast to the Sibuku River on the east. Both Sultanates were also in a state of decline. Brunei was suffering from internal decay while large parts of its territories were being swallowed up by the new state of Sarawak under the Brookes.

In the Philippine region, the Spanish authorities in Manila had been trying to subjugate the independent and powerful kingdom of Sulu for three centuries without success. In 1871, the Spaniards launched another exerted campaign to conquer the stubborn kingdom.

It was in this kind of environment that a number of European and American speculators became interested in obtaining territorial concessions from the two weak Sultanates for speculative purposes. Among them were Lee Moses and Joseph Torrey of America; and Baron von Overbeck and Alfred Dent who had formed a company called the Overbeck-Dent Association on March 27, 1877 in London for the purpose of obtaining land concessions in Sabah and selling them for a profit.

Overbeck and Dent acquired Brunei's jurisdiction over its Sabah possessions in five documents dated Dec 29, 1877 from the Sultan of Brunei and his ministers. After this, Overbeck sailed to Jolo where he also obtained the rights of the Sultan of Sulu in Sabah through two agreements concluded on Jan 22, 1878.

Why was Sultan Muhammad Jamaluladzan prepared to lease/ grant/ pajak his territories in Sabah to Overbeck and Dent? Sulu was on the brink of capitulating to the Spaniards and as such Sultan Muhammad was hopeful of obtaining some assistance from the Overbeck-Dent Association and possibly even from Britain. Placed in such dire straits, he was therefore not adverse to giving Overbeck and Dent territorial concessions in Sabah with some hope of salvation.

In the event, no such aid came either from the Overbeck-Dent Association or the British Government. Six months after the Overbeck-Dent grants were concluded, Sulu was conquered by the Spanish authorities on July 2 1878. With the fall of Sulu, the said Sultanate ceased to be an independent entity as it was incorporated as part of the Spanish colonial administration of the Philippines.

In 1898, Spain lost the Philippines to the United States by the Peace of Paris (Dec 10, 1898), which ended the Spanish-American War. The US ruled the Philippines till 1946 when independence was granted.

The sultanate ended when Sultan Jamalul Kiram II signed the Carpenter Agreement on March 22, 1915, in which he ceded all political power to the United States.

 

Carpenter, Governor of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, Philippine Islands,  from 1913-1920, with the Sultan of Sulu, Jamalul Kiram II.

Meanwhile, in 1936, the US colonial administration of the Philippines abolished the Sulu Sultanate upon the death of Sultan Jamalul Kiram II (1894-1936) in the same year in an attempt to create a unitary State of the Philippines. Jamalul Kiram III is a self- appointed “Sultan” with a dubious legal status.

Now, coming back to the question of Malaysia's ongoing treatment of the claim, and why and how it should completely alter this position. Since the official announcement of the claim by the Philippine Government on June 22, 1962, Malaysia has been pursuing an ambivalent policy. On the one hand, it has persistently rejected the Philippines claim, but on the other it has compromised Malaysia's sovereignty by agreeing to settle the “dispute” by peaceful means (such as the Manila Agreement, Aug 3, 1963) and a number of other mutual agreements between the two countries.

Most damaging of all is Malaysia's willingness to honour the clause in the 1878 Sulu grant pertaining to the payment of the annual quit rent or cession monies as Malaysia says, of RM5,300, to the descendants of the former Sulu Sultanate. To this day, Malaysia is still paying this quit rent, lending credence to the claimants' argument that the 1878 grant was a lease and not a cession and therefore it still belongs to them.

If Malaysia continues to follow this policy, there will be no end to this problem except to buy out the rights of the descendents of the Sultan of Sulu. But this course is fraught with danger as it will lead to further legal complications with the Philippines and even endless litigation with the descendants.

My proposal is that Malaysia should go by the laws of “effectivities”, as in the case of the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) judgement pertaining to the issue of sovereignty over the Sipadan and Ligitan islands, and the law of acts of a'titre de souverain as in the case of Pulau Batu Puteh. No title, however strong, is valid once the original owner fails to exercise acts consistent with the position of a'titre de souverain. The opposite is true, that is, the holder of the lease may not have original title but he ultimately gains permanent possession of the lease by virtue of continuous state “effectivities”.

In this case, the Sultan of Sulu and its successors including the Philippine government have failed to conduct any acts of a'titre de souverain since 1882, and so they have legally lost their title.

On the other hand, the successors of the Overbeck-Dent Association, that is the British North Borneo Company (1882-1946); the British Colonial Administration (1946-1963); and Malaysia, (from 1963) have been exercising continuous acts of a'titre de souverain for a period of 131 years.

Since we have all this evidence on our side, Malaysia should now take a new stand by totally rejecting the validity of the 1878 grants on the grounds of “effectivitie” and a'titre de souverain. It should also immediately stop paying the so-called annual quit rent or cession monies. This payment has always brought huge embarrassment to Malaysia and has in fact compromised its sovereignty.

We should also never agree to go to the International Court of Justice not because our case is weak (it is very strong), but because we don't want to trade the fate of sovereign territories and people through the judgment of any court, even the ICJ.

There's one more point that should be pondered upon. No country or state or nation which has obtained independence has ever paid ownership monies to its former masters. The 13 Colonies of America did not do so, India did not do so, the Federation of Malaya did not do so.

Sabah became an independent state on Aug 31, 1963 and decided to form the Federation of Malaysia with three other partners on Sept 16, 1963. It is strange indeed, if not preposterous, that a sovereign state is paying ownership or cession monies to certain people based on a colonial, pre-independence treaty that is 131 years old!

Comment by EMERITUS PROF DR D.S RANJIT SINGH

Emeritus Prof D. S. Ranjit Singh is Visiting Professor at the College of Law, Government and International Studies, Universiti Utara Malaysia (ranjit@uum.edu.my). 

Related posts:

The Sultan of Sulu reclaims eastern Sabah, MNLF among invaders

The former Sulu Sultanate, a foreign problem in history that became Sabah's  

The Sultan of Sulu reclaims eastern Sabah, MNLF among invaders

 

Carpenter, Governor of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, Philippine Islands,  from 1913-1920, with the Sultan of Sulu, Jamalul Kiram II.

 
THE Sultanate of Sulu was a traditional Islamic monarchy of the Tausug people that covered the Philippine provinces of Basilan, Palawan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the eastern part of Sabah.

It was founded in 1457 by religious scholar and explorer Sharif Abu Bakar, who assumed the title Sultan Shariful Hashim after his marriage to Paramisuli, a local princess.

He promulgated the first Sulu Code of Laws (Diwan) that were based on the Quran, and introduced an Islamic political institution and the consolidation of Islam as a state religion.

In 1675, the throne of what is now Brunei was disputed and the Sultan of Sulu was asked to settle the conflict, after which he was rewarded with North Borneo (now eastern Sabah).

In 1878, the Sulu Sultan leased North Borneo to the Europeans. The agreement stated that the lease was of their own free will and was valid until the end of time.

The sultanate received an annual cession payment that was equivalent to 5,000 Malayan dollars, which was increased to 5,300 Malayan dollars in 1903.

North Borneo was a British protectorate from the late 19th century until it became a crown colony.

It gained a brief period of independence before becoming part of Malaysia in 1963. From then, Malaysia paid RM5,300 as cession payment each year to the sultanate.

The former Sultan’s descendants did not retake the territory, instead, agreeing to accept the cession payment under the previous arra­ngement. This lasted until a few weeks ago.

The Sulu sultanate was also under the control of Spain, but the Spaniards in 1885 signed the Madrid Protocol with Britain and Germany, relinquishing any claim to North Borneo.

The sultanate ended when Sultan Jamalul Kiram II signed the Carpenter Agreement on March 22, 1915, in which he ceded all political power to the United States.

The Philippines, however, continued to recognise the sultanate as a sovereign entity until the demise of Sultan Mohd Mahakuttah A. Kiram in 1986.

There are now at least 11 claimants to the title Sultan of Sulu, including Sultan Jamalul Kiram III.

MNLF elements among invaders

PETALING JAYA: The Sulu invaders are not officially recognised by any group other than the self-styled Sulu Sultanate and its supporters, said Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia Professor Dr Aruna Gopinath.

“This is just a name this group has decided to create and call themselves by so that they can come and attack us.

“The bigger threat is if other militants join this group under the banner of the south Philippines and try to attack us as well,” said Aruna, an expert on Philippine history, politics and security.

Some of the Sulu fighters were possibly trained by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) led by Nur Misuari before they broke away from the group.

She explained that many of the armed militants in southern Philippines used to be members of the MNLF, from which many breakaway groups later emerged with most of them belonging to the Suluk or Tausug ethnic group, which the MNLF once represented.

“Some among the so-called Sulu army could have had combat experience during their previous stint in the MNLF before they broke away. They do have some degree of skill and are not mere marauders as there appears to be some quite capable people on the ground,” said Aruna.

She said that when Misuari became MNLF head he clamoured for secession but the Philippine Government insisted on autonomy as the only option.

While Misuari accepted, another leader Hashim Selamat did not and broke away with his supporters to form the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

When the MILF later realised that secession was not the answer it agreed to negotiate for greater autonomy with the Philippines, a process Malaysia is helping to broker.

The MILF, said Aruna, is currently the biggest armed group in the southern Philippines with a standing army of more than 200,000.

She said the MNLF no longer has a large army because apart from the MILF breakaway, other splinter groups also emerged later including the Abu Sayyaf and the Rajah Sulayman militant group.

Aruna said many youths in the troubled region join armed groups due to endemic poverty.

“Parts of the south do not even have piped water and proper roads and the MNLF and MILF soldiers I've interviewed said they basically joined because they were hungry, so poverty is a driving factor.”

Universiti Utara Malaysia Emeritus Professor Dr Ranjit Singh said that aside from the sultan's supporters, some among the Sulu terrorists could also be followers of the many local warlords in the region.

“However, since there is no Sultanate of Sulu at present, and with so many claimants to the throne, an officially recognised army does not exist,” he said.

Sources: The Star/Asian News Network

Related posts:
The former Sulu Sultanate, a foreign problem in history that became Sabah's  

 

Filipinos’ Sulu militant group in Sabah must leave Malaysia today

Muslims at the Golden Mosque in Quiapo district of Manila on Saturday express their support to Sulu Sultan Jamalul Kiram III and followers who are Sabah in press for their claim. DANNY PATA

LAHAD DATU: Malaysia has extended the deadline for the Sulu armed group to move out of Tanduo village and return home to today, following a request from the Philippines.

The Philippine Government had earlier asked for the deadline to be set for Tuesday to allow them to persuade Sultan Jamalul Kiram III to order his brother Azzimudie Kiram and the armed group of more than 100 to get out of Tanduo village in Felda Sahabat 17 where they have been holed up since Feb 9.

The request was made to Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Anifah Aman by his Philippine counterpart Albert del Rosario after the expiry of the Friday deadline.

Anifah, however, told The Star that he had conveyed the decision on the new Sunday deadline to Rosario.

“We are hoping the stand-off will end peacefully with the latest deadline,” he said, echoing Home Minister Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Hussein's statement that he wanted the two-week stand-off to “end sooner than later” without bloodshed.

Hishammuddin told reporters in Kluang that the extended period would not be too long as his ministry would leave it to the security forces to conduct an operation to end the stand-off.

He said the Tanduo incident was different from the country's past experience with armed groups such as Al-Maunah, Abu Sayyaf and Jemayah Islamiah as this group claimed to be descendents of the Sulu sultanate.

However, he said the country's sovereignty and the pride of the Sabah people must not be taken for granted.

The priority of the armed forces was to defuse the situation without bloodshed as it could affect Malaysia's good relationship with the Philippines, he said, adding that the preparation for the deportation of the Sulu group “is in the final stage”.

As the Philippine Government tries to persuade the Sulu Sultan to take their Sabah claim demand to a diplomatic level, the Kiram family has been adamant and had asked Azzimudie's group to stay put in Tanduo.

Although emissaries have been negotiating with Azzimudie, the political pressure in Manila has been mounting on President Benigno Aquino and his Cabinet to resurrect the long dormant Sabah claim following talk that the Oct 15 peace deal with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front had left out the Sulu sultanate as well as Nur Misuari's Moro National Liberation Front.

To help defuse and bring the stand-off to a peaceful conclusion, Philippine Defence Secretary Voltaire Gazmin said he and his Malaysian counterpart, including the armed forces of both countries, were closely coordinating their actions and exchanging information.

Gazmin said the Philippine military had enforced a naval blockade in the Sulu Sea to prevent undocumented Filipinos from entering Sabah as reports emerged that other groups from southern Philippines were poised to help Azzimudie's gunmen.

Stating that the Sulu group was pursuing its Sabah claim the wrong way, Gazmin revealed that six navy ships and a transport vessel were on standby in Tawi Tawi, about a 15-minute fast boat ride to Tanduo village.

By P.K. KATHARASON, MUGUNTAN VANAR and MOHD FARHAAN SHAH The Star/Asia News Network

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The Philippines broken ranks with Asean

HIGH STAKES: In its zeal to take on China's claims in the South China Sea, the Philippines has alienated itself
 

The official map of the Philippines labels the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea and includes Sabah.

By  initiating an arbitral proceeding against China, the Philippines has upped the ante in the South China Sea. Manila says it is left with no choice but to take Beijing to arbitration after exhausting all remedies. However, many see Manila's action as a desperate act -- a publicity stunt to regain international prestige following the Scarborough Shoal fiasco in April last year.

Manila's request for an arbitral award opens up a can of worms, especially when its Regime of Islands claim (to the Kalayaan Islands and Scarborough Shoal) under its 2009 Baseline Law is contestable under international law.

Incidentally, its new official map that has renamed the South China Sea as the West Philippines Sea has re-incorporated Sabah, which is sure to reopen old wounds.

People who live in glasshouses should not throw stones, as they will expose not only the throwers' hypocrisy but also vulnerability.

No one doubts that Manila is fed-up with Beijing's intransigence. Lately, the Philippines has mounted diplomatic and political offensives in the South China Sea in a hope to get the United States and the international community to sanction China. Unfortunately, following a rebuff by Washington, the offensive failed to undermine China, the Goliath who was close to former president Gloria Arroyo, now under house arrest.

As a domestic political agenda, Manila's unilateral legal proceeding is likely to be futile again. Its success record in international arbitration has been dismal. For example in 1927, the US, acting on behalf of Manila, failed to convince judge Max Huber that the island of Palmas belonged to the Philippines. The judge awarded the ownership of the island (now known as Miangas) to Indonesia, although the island is within the 1898 Treaty of Paris Limits.

In October 2001, the Philippines sought permission to intervene as a non- party in the case involving the sovereignty of Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan. the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rejected (14 to 1) the request.

China, the world's second largest economy and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, has said no to arbitration proceedings. Without its consent, it is unlikely for the tribunal to act; furthermore, the tribunal may lack jurisdiction to hear the case.

Manila has insinuated that Beijing can no longer hide behind its declarations under Article 298 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In 2006, China declared, "it does not accept any of the procedures provided in Section 2 of Part XV of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with respect of all categories of disputes...", including sovereignty issues.

Manila says this proceeding against China is not over sovereignty. Yet, the notification statement implies the contrary.

Manila wants the proposed tribunal to determine the legality of China's nine-dash line of 1948 and to determine the legal status of 10 features that China has occupied in the South China Sea (mainly in the Spratlys) as either "islands or rocks". These issues are jurisdictional in nature. The nine-dash line relates to jurisdictional and sovereignty issues.

The Philippines brings the case to the tribunal under UNCLOS. Those familiar with jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea are aware of the nine-dash line, published in 1948. This means the line has preceded UNCLOS by thirty-four years; UNCLOS came into force in 1996.

The only way for UNCLOS to have jurisdiction over the case is to give it a retrospective power, which arguably constitutes an abuse of rights and goes against the legal principle of good faith (Article 300 of UNCLOS).

The unfortunate omission of the applicable law under Article 38 of the ICJ Statute in the notification statement has significantly weakened Manila's position.

I also find it puzzling for Manila to ask the tribunal to "require China to bring its domestic legislation into conformity with its obligations under UNCLOS".

On the diplomatic front, Manila has garnered zero support from the claimant parties.

Their silence results possibly from disagreement with the manner the Philippines handled a vital matter in the light of Statement on Asean's Six Point Principles on the South China Sea of July 20 last year.

Moreover, Manila's objection in May 2009 to the Joint submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is still fresh in the minds of Hanoi and Kuala Lumpur.

Is Manila telling the world that it has broken ranks with Asean?

The way forward is not to break ranks but to mend fences with China.

by Dr BA Hamzah New Straits Times

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Philippines wants rearmed Japan to contain China 
Tensions in South China Sea: US won’t take sides...
Manila and ASEAN: Upping the ante on the South China Sea
Overhyping the South China Sea 

Engage maids directly instead of costly maid agencies in Malaysia

WHEN put in perspective, if a spouse in a Malaysian household resigns from her job as a substitute for a maid, with a conservative average monthly income of RM3,000, that is RM36,000 less on the household table.

Take into account 300,000 Indonesian maids that used to work here and you have a scenario, where families in this country will be forgoing RM11bil in potential household revenue.

It seems obvious that middlemen are trying to blatantly profit from the urgent need for maids.

On one side of the coin, you have Malaysian maid agencies who used to charge up to RM8,000 for securing a maid and when the Government announced a moratorium on fees chargeable, the Indonesia side immediately claimed the fee was too low (See article below).

Invariably, both the employer and the maid are the victims. In any employment sector, it is very unusual for a potential employee to pay a fee to be employed.

The argument for deductions put forth by maid agencies, that the deduction is for loans given to maids and for training, does not make sense.

Perhaps a holistic solution would be to allow Indonesian agents to open offices in Malaysia and work directly with Malaysian employers.

Create a maid training facility, where maids can arrive and be trained within a short period of 10 working days.

Such a facility can be co-sponsored by the Malaysian Govern­ment. All it should entail is 10 to 20 low- to medium-cost flats that can house 200 to 300 maids, with a common area that allows for training.

Concurrently, increase the maid’s salary to RM800 per month in lieu of any advance payment and no increase in the agent’s fee.

There should be no need for any advance payment with full payment to be made upon final selection, when the employer takes the maid home. Peg the agent’s fee at RM1,500, with reimbursements for other costs, from levy to travel, that must be substantiated with proper receipts.

This is similar to what is charged in Singapore.

The training programme should not cost more than RM1,500. Which means the total cost can be pegged between RM4,500 and RM5,000 at most.

Get agreement with the Indonesian government on the process for direct engagement with maids.

Maids should only be required to go through an orientation programme similar to Singapore’s SIP (Settling-In-Programme) for foreign domestic workers.

Maids should not be allowed to work for more than eight hours a day. If required to work overtime, they should be entitled to a minimum hourly rate of RM8 to RM10 per hour.

Create a toll-free number manned by agencies that will monitor the welfare of maids, to ensure their overall well-being at all times.

Souce: B. J. FERNANDEZ  Shah Alam, The Star views

Maid agencies: Fees are too low?

By YVONNE LIM  The Star

PETALING JAYA: Maid agencies are adamant that the RM4,511 fee imposed by the Government for Indonesian maids is too low, as the actual cost to recruit a maid is double the amount.

Many described the fee, which was agreed to in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur last year, as “impossible to meet” and said that they have been running at a loss while trying to comply with it.

An agency owner, who declined to be named, said that despite demand, his agency had stopped recruiting Indonesian maids as he would spend up to RM10,000.

He said the fees charged by Indonesian maid suppliers started at RM5,500 including training, medical check-up, transport and recruitment fees, as well as duit susu, which is a contribution paid to the families of the maids.

“If we are being charged RM5,500 per maid, how can you expect agencies to comply with a fee of RM4,511, especially now that the cost has gone up for everything, including air travel?” he asked.

He urged the Government to review the amount and consult both Indonesian and Malaysian agency representatives so that a more realistic fee could be set.

Malaysian employers had previously called for Papa to justify the increase in Indonesian maid fees by agencies by up to RM12,000 and asked for a breakdown of costs.

Some had also urged the association to pressure its members to comply with the agreed fee, saying that the high demand for maids would compensate for it.

A spokesman for another agency said her company was now charging RM9,800 per Indonesian maid.

“We have already lowered the fee, but we cannot do much as our Indonesian partners are charging close to RM6,000 per maid,” she said.

Association of Foreign Maid Agencies (Papa) president Jeffrey Foo said that prior to the morato-rium on maids from Indonesia, employers had no qualms about paying up to RM9,000 for domestic helpers.

“We voiced our disagreement on the RM4,511 fee when the Govern-ment consulted us as it is simply too low, and were shocked when they settled on that price in the MoU anyway,” he said.

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